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Ill
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION;
Article I, Section 1:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."
Article I, Section 2:
"All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require."
Article I, Section 10:
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital
casesp a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases
three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civ".,
cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Article I, Section 12:
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense."
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION:

(continued)

Article I, Section 14:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized."
Article I, Section 10:
"All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution
or by the laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon
the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe
the following oath or affirmation:"
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of this State, and that I will discharge the duties
of my office with fidelity."
Article VIII, Section 9«
"From all final judgments of the district courts, there
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal
shall be upon the record made in the court below and under such
regulations as may be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal
may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the
appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also
lie from, the final orders and decrees of the Court in the administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as
shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final
judgment of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases tc
the District Courts on both questions of law and fact, with such
limitations and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the
decision of the District Courts on such appeals shall be final,
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of
a statute."
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
Article VI, paragraph 2:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
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x

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

(continued)

AMMENDMENT V:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in joepardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."

xi
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Appellant's Brief - page 1
IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a criminal case, based on the allegation that the
Appellant violated certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code of
the State of Utah.

The Appellant was charged and covicted of

five (5) class B misdemeanors all arising from a single episode.
The charges being; Count I: Failure to comply with the lawful order
of a police officer, contrary to Section 41-6-13, U.C.A.

Count II;

Failure to produce a driver's license, contrary to Section 41-2-15,
U.C.A.

(Count II was brought in the Justice Court and dismissed

in the District Court)

Count II: (New charge brought in the District

Court, replacing the charge dismissed) Operation of a motor vehicle
without a license, contrary to Section 41-2-2, U.C.A.

Count III:

Operation of an unsafe motor vehicle, contrary to Section 41-6-117
U.C.A.

Count IV: Operate without registration, contrary to Section

41-1-18, U.C.A.

Count V: Failure to display a safety inspection

sticker, contrary to Section 41-6-158, U.C.A.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The Appellant was stopped by a Salina City policeman, (Charles
\Aioodside) on the evening of 24 February, 1984, for alledgedly having
a broken headlight, or broken tail lights.

The Appellant was
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Appellant's Brief - page 2
brought before the Justice of the Peace for Salina City, Thad
Wasden, that evening for arraignment.

The Appellant was jailed

that evening for refusing to waive his right to counsel at that
time.

The Appellant was released from jail the next day and returned

for arraignment on 9 March 1984. After two (2) motion hearings,
the Appellant was tried and convicted on five (5) counts for
alledged violations of the motor vehicle code of the State of Utah.
The Appellant appealed to the District Court of the Sixth
Judicial District for Sevier County, for a review of the judgment
in the Justice Court.

The Appellant filed his Appellant's Brief

(record pp. 137 - 157) on 13 June 1984. The District Court Judge,
Don V. Tibbs, chose to proceed with a trial de novo, and a second
trial was held 9 October 1984 in the Sevier County Courthouse,
Richfield, Utah.

A 6 person jury found the Appellant guilty on

4 of the original counts and 1 new count.
The Appellant was sentenced on 14 November 1984, and immediately
incarcerated by order of the District Court Judge.

The Appellant

petitioned the Court at his sentencing for a certificate of probable
cause to stay the execution of his sentence pending this appeal.
The District Court denied the Appellant's motion, and he was
immediately incarcerated in the Sevier County Jail.

The Appellant

sought relief from the trial Court to resentence him in accordance
with the original sentence of the Justice Court, which was denied
on 28 November 1984.
On 29 November 1984, the Appellant brought an original complaint
in this Court seeking extraordinary relief in the form of Habeas
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant's Brief - page 3
Corpus, and Mandamus, to order the District Court to resentence
the Appellant in compliance with the law, and immediate release
pending adjudication of the Appellant's Complaint.

This Court

issued its order to the District Court on the 6th day of December,
1984, mandating that Court to resentence the Appellant in compliance
with the original sentence from the Justice Court, with time already
served to be credited to the Appellant.
The Appellant now brings this appeal to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah from the final judgment of the District Court.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

The Appellant was sentenced in the Justice Court for the City
of Salina to 14 days in the County jail on Counts I and II, both to
be served concurently with each other.

He was also sentenced to

$299 fines and $6 assessment on Counts I and II, $38 for count III,
and $30 for count IV, no sentence was imposed for count V.

He

was also sentenced to 30 days probation pending his appeal to the
District Court.
Following the trial de novo, the Appellant was sentenced by
the District Court to six (6) months in the County jail for each
of the five (5) counts which the Appellant had been found guilty
of.

Two (2) terms were to be served concurently with the other

three, bringing the Appellant's sentence to a total of 18 months
in the County jail.

No fines were imposed.
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The Appellant was resentenced on 9 January 1985i to comply
with the original sentence of the Justice Court, pursuant to the
order of this Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

The Appellant is a natural person.

(record pp. 66 - 75,

transcript p. 43, lines 8 - 1 1 )
2.

The Appellant is a Free person.

(record pp. 66 - 75,

transcript p. ^3» lines 8 - 11)
3.

The Appellant is entitled to, and claims all Rights, Duties,

and Responsibilities according to his status.

(record p. 66,

transcript p. 43, lines 9 - 11)
4.

The Appellant is not engaged in trade, commerce, business,

or industry in his private use of the highway.

{

(record p. 162,

para. 6)
5.

The Appellant was not engaged in trade, commerce, business,

(

or industry on the evening of the incident which this action arose
from.

(transcript, Appellant's testimony)

6.

This matter was first heard in the Justice Court for

Salina City.
7.

(record pp. 1 & 2)

The Appellant challenged the Jurisdiction of the Justice

Court, in the Justice Court.
8.

(record pp. 95 - 97)

The alledged incident occured within the corporate city

limits of the City of Salina, County of Sevier, State of Utah.
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9.

The Appellant is not a firm, copartnership, association,

or corporation, and is not a member of such, (record p. 66)
10.

The Appellant is not bound or obligated by any contract

which would alter his status as it pertains to this case.

(record

pp. 66, 138 - 139, 162)
11.

The Appellant is an unenfranchised individual.

pp. 66 - 75,
12.

(record

95 - 123, 137 - 139, 158 - 163)

The Appellant is a citizen of the State of Utah.

(not

in record)
13.

The Appellant owns his property as a matter of right,

(not in record)
14.

The Appellant has not accepted as privilege his right to

travel, or his right to use his property.
15.

(record p. 66)

The property of the Appellant is one 3/4 ^on

truck, color blue, year 1968, VIN: C2546Z125417.
16.

(record pp. 64 - 65)

The Appellant was not advised of his rights at any

subsequent appearance before the Magistrate.
18.

(not in record)

The Appellant was not advised of his rights at his first

appearance before a Magistrate.
17.

pick up

(record pp. 62, 64 - 65)

The Appellant was not afforded counsel by the police

officers at the alledged scene of the crime.

(transcript pp. 136,

149)
19.

The Appellant was refused counsel, and denied counsel of

his choice at his first appearance before the Magistrate.
pp. 64 - 65)
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20.

The Appellant's property was taken from him as punishment

on the evening of 24 February 1984. (not in record)
21.

The Appellant has been punished for greater penalties than

allowable by statute, (not in record)
22.

The Justice of the Peace sought legal counsel from the

prosecutor.
23.

(no record available)

The Justice Court jury voi dire was substantially weighted

in favor of the prosecutor.
24.

The Justice of the Peace threw away the Appellant's jury

instructions.
25.

(no record available)

(no record available)

The Appellant was denied his right to present testimony

in his own behalf, in the Justice Court.
26.

The Appellant exercised his right to privacy at the incident

which this case arises from.
27.

(no record available)

(transcript p. 89, lines 9 - 13)

The Appellant did not cause loss or injury to another at

the incident which this case arises from.

(transcript pp. 123 - 124,

lines 23 - 25 & 1 - 11; p. 126, lines 1 - 24; pp. 128 - 13O5 p. 132,
lines 13 - 19)
28.

The Justice of the Peace refused to rule on any issue in-

volving the Utah State Constitution or the U.S. Constitution.

(record

not in record)
29.

The Justice of the Peace did not uphold the oath of office

required by Utah Constitution.
30.

There is no record that Thad Wasden ever took the oath of

office required by Article IV, Section 10, Utah Constitution, and the
Appellant has been refused access to said oath by Judge Wasden.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT #1

Appellant argues that the Justice Court lacked

jurisdiction.

POINT #2

Appellant argues that the appeals process, and the

forum for review on appeals from the Justice Court, denies him
equal protection of the law.

POINT #3

Appellant argues the validity of the statute under

which he was charged with failing to obey a lawful order.
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ARGUMENT

POINT #1

DID THE JUSTICE COURT HAVE PLENERY JURISDICTION TO
ADJUDICATE THIS CAUSE?

The Defendant intends to argue this point in 5 segments. He
would contend that the Justice Court lacked the jurisdiction to
consider this matter.

The Defendant did not enter a plea in the

Justice Court, objecting to its jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the person of the Defendant.

He likewise objected to the Justice

of the Peace entering a plea for him, and assuming jurisdiction over
him.

The Defendant challenged jurisdiction and filed numerous

pleadings in the Justice Court for lack of jurisdiction.
pp. 95 - 123)

(record

The Justice Court, having had its jurisdiction

challenged, simply ignored the Defendant's objections and proceded
without answer or proof of jurisdiction.

This action of itself

denied the Court its jurisdiction, for;

"Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven."
Hagens v Lavine, 415 U.S. 533, note 3

Although the' Justice Court may have had territorial jurisdiction
to hear a cause pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-25-1, and jurisdiction
for appearance to a magistrate, pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-7-19,
the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate this cause for
the following reasons.
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Appellant's Brief - page 8
1.

STATUS of the Defendant

2.

RIGHTS of the Defendant

3.

SUBJECT MATTER of Title kl, U.C.A.

k.

SELF IMPOSED DENIAL OF JURISDICTION by the Justice of the
Peace

5.

THAD WASDEN is not a duly sworn Justice of the Peace

STATUS

To begin this argument for lack of jurisdiction in the Justice
Court, the Defendant prays that this Court first understand the
basis from which the Defendant claims this highly irregular status
of "Free and Natural Citizen."

To do this, the Defendant must first

define "status", to understand the meaning of it and then apply it
to himself.

STATUS: The status of an individual used as a legal term,
means the legal position of the individual in or with regard to
the rest of the community. The rights, duties, capacities and
incapacities which determine a person to a given class, constitute his status. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (191^) p. 3129

Derived from this definition are two very important points to
consider.

First, that there are given (separate) classes of persons;

and second, such classes of persons are delineated by the individual's
rights, duties, and capacities or incapacities.

Consequently, the

Defendant declares his status as a Free and Natural Citizen and
contends that due to his status the application of Title 4lf U.C.A.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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does not apply to him any more than federal imigration laws, as he
is a U.S. Citizen, or this State's contractor's laws, as he does not
build anything.

Those laws in and of themselves may be Constitutional,

as may Title 4l, when appropriately applied to those persons who are
foreign to the United States in the first instance, or those persons
involved in construction in the second.

The same would be true if the

Defendant were a banker, doctor, or partner in a business endeavor. He
would be regulated by such laws governing those institutions.

As this

case involves Title ^1, U.C.A., and specifically those sections for
which the Defendant was charged with having violated, the Defendant
must show how those laws are unconstitutional in attempting to effect
an involuntary change in his status.

In addition, the Plaintiff

never presented evidence to prove that the Defendant was of such a
status that Title ^1 would apply to him, and the Justice Court never
required it. Title 4l cannot apply to the Defendant without his
consent, just as the banking & contracting laws, etc., cannot apply
to him without his consent.
U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t) attempts to define the Defendant, who
is a natural person, in the same context with classes of juristic
persons under the catch-all definition of "person".

(addendum #1)

This type of legislation attempts to lead one to the conclusion
that all are subject to the law, and amounts to nothing more than
legal debauchery.

Such a conclusion is a fiction of law!

The Defendant would contend that though the legislature may
define and redefine words and meanings until their intent has lost
all comprehension, they cannot by simple catch-all definition, alter
Digitized
by the Howard
Hunter Law Library, J.
Reubenand
Clark Law
School, BYU.
or change who and
what
theW.Defendant
is;
limit
by such definition
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Appellant's Brief - page 10
his Rights and Immunities, which are protected for him by the
Constitution.

In addition, the Defendant is not, nor can he be a

firm, copartnership, association, or corporation, or he will cease
to exist as a natural person.
its definition.

That being, a "natural person" by

This is found in the following definition of

"person".

PERSON: A man considered according to the rank he holds
in society, with all the right to which the place he holds
entitles him, and the duties which it imposes.
Persons are the subject of rights and duties;
and, as a subject of a right, the person is the object of
the correlative duty, and conversely. Bouvier's Law
Dictionary (191*0 P- 257^
Every full citizen is a person; other human
beings, namely, subjects who are not citizens, may be persons.
But not every human being is necessarily a person, for a
person is capable of rights and duties, and there may well be
human beings having no legal rights, as was the case with slaves
in English law....A person is such, not because he is human,
but because rights and duties are ascribed to him. The person
is the legal subject or substance of which the rights and
duties are attributes. An individual human being considered as
having such attributes is what lawyers call a natural person.
Bouvier's, p. 2575

Notice that, "A person is such, not because he is human, but
because rights and duties are ascribed to him."
there may be human beings who are not "persons".

In another respect,
Using this same

logic5 there may be "persons" who are not "natural persons". The
difference being the rights, duties, and capacities of one compared
to the other.

The point the Defendant makes is the consideration

of corporations, corporate status, and human beings who have entered
corporate status. Even though the corporation operates or functions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as a "person", its Rights, Duties, and Capacities are less than
that of a "natural person" or "citizen", and there may be human
beings who are reduced to such corporate status through contract.
Such human beings are not natural persons, but are subjects by
contract.

Yes, they may still vote!

refered to as "citizens".

And because of that they are

But, they are "subjects" through contract,

and are subject to the same regulations that govern the corporation.
Hence, the Defendant declares his status to be that of a
Natural Person.

He is not bound or obligated in such a way as

to deprive him of his rights, duties, and capacities.

The

corporation, etc., has no rights, it exists under privilege as a
creature of the State.
Observe now the difference between a "subject" and a "citizen".

SUBJECT: One who owes allegiance to a sovereign and is
governed by the sovereign's laws. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
edition, p. 1277
An individual member of a nation, who is subject
to the laws. This term is used in contradistinction to citizen
which is applied to the same individual when considering his
political rights.
Subject is a wider term than citizen; there are
members of the state who, by reason of natural or conventional
disability, do not enjov full political rights. Bouvier' s,
p. 3163

CITIZEN: One of the sovereign people. A constitutent
member of the sovereignty, synonymous with the people.
Bouvierfs, p. 490

The Defendant recognizes that the State of Utah is a sovereign.
That sovereignty however, is limited for the protection of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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original sovereignty of the people.
sovereign in this State.
Section 2,

It is the people who are

(Utah State Constitution Article I,

see Constitutional Provisions, this brief, p. IX

Notice that government, i.e. the State of Utah, is founded on
the authority which resides in the people.
Hence, the Defendant claims his status to be that of a Natural
Citizen.

He is a natural person because of Rights, Duties, and

Capacities; and a Citizen, when considering his political rights.
As shown by definition, other human beings may be persons, or they
may be subjects thru contract, or members of corporations, etc.
If they are such however, they cannot be Natural Citizens, for they
are "subject" to the law. Which ever that "law" is that applies
to them.
It may very well be within the legislature's power to define
"person" for its application of Title kl to certain individuals.

It

cannot however, alter the status of the Defendant as a natural person
by including natural persons with corporations, etc., in the catch-all
manner as previously described.

This is an attempt to create the

illusion that all human beings are subject to that section of the
Code.
U.C.A. Section 68-3-12(5) defines "person" for general use in
the Utah Code.

(see addendum #2)

Nowhere is there any definition of "natural person" in the Utah
Code.

It is for this reason that the Defendant turns to the Law

Dictionary for enlightenment on the subject.

In addition, the

legislature, when using the word "person" in Title M , must consider
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its intent and meaning when applying its use to an unenfranchised
individual.
There is a major difference between individuals and corporations,
or human beings who exist in a corporate capacity, whom the Defendant
would contend are the "persons" refered to in Title 4-1, U.C.A.
In respect to individuals and corporations, the U.S. Supreme
Court, (Hale v Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74) recognized the distinction
between them, and ruled that the individual may stand on his
constitutional rights as a citizen.

The individual owes no duty to

the state since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection
of his life and property.

And, that he owes nothing to the public,

so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.

The corporation

cannot claim such protection, and must submit itself at the suit of
the state.

(addendum #3)

As a Natural Person, and as a Citizen of these United States,
and the State of Utah, the Defendant claims also to be "Free".
Hence the addressing of his status as a Free and Natural Citizen,
or FREEMAN.

But, from whom does he derive his Free status?

"I, the Lord God, make you free, therefore ye are free
indeed; and the law also maketh you free." Doctrine and
Covenants, Section 98:8

The law which the Lord God refers to in this passage of
scripture (ie. law), is the Constitutional law of the land, and as
pertaining to law of man, whatsoever is more or less than this
cometh of evil.
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Title kl

is the law of man.

Its application is to compel

specific performance on its subjects, in an effort to insure conduct
of a moral nature, and to prevent harm or injury.
The Defendant is already a moral being.
Creator with a conscience.

He is endowed by his

As declared by his Creator, he is free,

and is given his agency to act and to exist as a natural person.

"The Lord said unto Enoch; Behold these thy brethren;
they are the workmanship of mine own hands, and I gave unto
them their knowledge, in the day I created them; and in the
Garden of Eden, gave I unto man his agency." Moses, 7:32

By virtue of his origin, the Defendant is free to act and
exercise his agency.

He is therefore endowed with a conscience and

is restrained by it while exercising his agency, from trespassing on
the rights of others.

This agency is necessary in order for him to

account to his Creator for his actions.

He is given this agency by

his Creator to chose for himself, for good or for evil.

i/uhen he

forfeits his agency, or it is taken from him, he no longer can
account to his Creator for his acts.

This is a gross deprivation of

his right to stand before God and render an accounting over his
stewardship during his mortal existance.

This concept of agency is

deeply embedded in the Defendant's religious upbringing, and is what
forms his moral character.
The founding fathers of this Country understood the need for
man to be free, to act and to choose his own destiny.

They

understood that man was accountable for his actions, and therefore
his agency must not be impaired.

For this reason, they organized
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and defined those provisions of their Creator in order to protect
their agency.

They were identified as Rights, endowed by their

Creator, inherent and unalienable.

These rights and immunities are

to protect the Citizen from the stealthy encroachments on his agency
by government, and to keep government from taking away his freedom
and accountability to his Creator.
The corporation however, has no conscience or moral existance.
It is a creature of the state, and being such, the state is responsible
for its actions.
fiction.

The corporation is not a moral being, it is a paper

It has no spirit!

It has no soul!

It has no conscience!

It exists forever with no accountability to God!
Being solely a creature of the state, the state must regulate
the corporation to insure its conduct to be that of a moral nature,
and to insure that it does not trespass on the rights of Citizens.
Thus the need for statutory regulation.
rights inherent and unalienable.

The corporation has no

It is granted privilege.

Privilege

to exist, and to act as if it were a person.
By defining "person" in the Motor Vehicle Code, U.C.A. Section
4l-l-l(t), the legislature seeks to, and in effect has succeeded in
altering the status of every natural person desiring to exercise his
liberty, and travel by the modern conveyance of the day.

The only

reason this has been successful is because, over the years people have
waived their rights and received for privilege the so-called "right
to drive."

Having the unlimited right to contract, they do so by

securing a driver's license from the state.
They purchase a motor vehicle through a bank.

(evidence of consent)
(a corporation)
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donft own their property, they only possess an equitable interest
in it. They become a member of a corporation through contract, and
thereby enter into privilege and statuory regulation.
insurance from an insurance company.
contract, compelled by statute)

They purchase

(another corporation, another

They have transfered responsibility

of their actions to that corporation, thereby limiting their
liability and risk for their actions. Now, if they cause a loss or
injury to another, they are not responsible for the loss or injury
they have caused, the insurance company is.
Because they have moved from status to contract, such individuals
are no longer free, but have become juristic and subject to the
statutory or regulatory law of state which governs the corporation.
That law, in this case, is Title ^1 U.C.A. and the sections under which
the Defendant was charged.

They are now "subject to the law" of the

sovereign ie. the state, as the Prosecutor so eloquently claims.
Such persons no longer claim certain rights and immunities, for they
have exchanged certain capacities, duties, and responsibilities for
privilege and limited liability.

They have in effect, become the

very creatures which the legislature attempts to define as "person"
in U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t), by including "natural persons" in the
definition.
The Defendant would contend that what Bouvier defines as a
natural person, is different from the intent and meaning of what a
natural person is in U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t).
The Defendant contends that the legislature included "natural
persons" in the enabling statute of Title kl U.C.A., because
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corporations, etc. cannot themselves travel on the highways.

Only

human beings are capable, at this time, of being able to operate and
control vehicles driven by internal combustion engines, or the like.
Certain human beings, which comprise the body and function of
corporations, must of necessity and nature, be the ones who "drive'1
on the highways.

The Defendant would contend that it is "members"

and other "human beings" who are juristic in nature, which are
intended to be defined in U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t), and not "natural
persons."

Natural persons have rights, and Title M , U.C.A. does

not recognize rights as they apply to the Defendant.
The Defendant again contends that even though he is a natural
person, he is not a person as defined by U.C.A. Section M-l-l(t).
That section,only applies to persons in a corporate capacity andj
cannot bring him into the jurisdiction of the Motor Vehicle Code.
To alter his status by such legislative gymnastics, in an effort to
compel him to the specific performance required in order for him to
enjoy his right to travel, is to substantially deprive him of his
Freedom, his Liberty, his Property, and his accountability to his
God.
The Defendant has not waived his Right to travel, nor has he
consented to be regulated.

Implied consent cannot apply in this case.

The Defendant is not engaged in trade, commerce, business, or industry,
nor does he use the highway in an extraordinary way.
he does not affect the Public interest.

That is to say,

The legislature does not

have the capacity to alter or change the status of the Defendant
without his consent, just as it cannot make the Defendant a banker,
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a contractor, or a doctor by simply legislating him to be such.
Therefore, enforcement of Title hi U.C.A. on the Defendant is not
valid.

Title 4l U.C.A. may be constitutional when applying it to

corporate status. However, when the agents of the King use the same
statute to compel the Defendant to a specific performance, that
statute is unconstitutional in nature, and the Defendant challenges
it as such.
In this respect, the Justice Court lacked the jurisdiction to
adjudicate this matter.

RIGHTS

The Rights of the Defendant is the central issue of the cause
before this Court on appeal.

The Defendant contends that his rights

are what grant him immunity from prosecution of these charges, and
therefore the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Defendant has

previously described his status as a Freeman, and he is entitled to
full consideration of his rights when any law is applied to him.
lAi'hen a law works in such a capacity as to compel a specific performance
of the Defendant as a natural person, that law is outside its
application as pertains to the Defendant, and the Justice Court
cannot simply assume jurisdiction in an effort to prove to the
Defendant that its not nice to challenge a Judge's jurisdiction.

To

simply assert that all laws are applicable to everyone is such an
absurdity, the Defendant finds it almost unworthy to address.

Equally

as absurd is the grandiose statement of the Prosecutor that, "we're
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all subject to these laws." (transcript p. 192)

Unless of course,

the Prosecutor meant that we are all subject to constitutional laws.
Title kl U.C.A. does not recognize the rights of a natural
person, and in that respect it does not recognize constitutional
law, of which it is subject to.
para. 2)

(U.S. Constitution, Article VI

As previously explained, it recognizes, and therefore

operates only at corporate capacity.

That is, a capacity which

operates at privilege and is therefore regulated by the state.
The Defendant does not operate at privilege.
matter of Right.

He travels as a

He has not caused injury to another, and no such

claim has been alledged in this action.

No corpus delecti exists,

nor is there any cause of action other than simple allegations that
the Defendant did not specifically perform.
M

Does such law as Title

U.C.A. propounds, delineate the rights of the Defendant while

attempting to compel him to a specific performance?

NO! Who can

compel this Free person to do anything, where by the course of his
own free action he does not infringe on the rights of others?
LIBERTY
The Defendant claims his right to travel under the libertyclause of the Constitution of the United States, Ammendment V, and
the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 1.

Such

right to travel includes the unrestrained use of the highway.

HIGHWAY: A passage, road, or street which every citizen
(person) has a right to use. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 9^0
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The highway was not created for the purposes of the state, nor
can the state claim to own it.
of the state.

It existed long before the creation

The state was created to secure and protect the rights

of the Citizens to use the highway for their ordinary business.

The

Defendant of course, is not implying that this was the sole purpose
for creating government, but only to point out that highways are as
ancient as man himself, and is is one means through which he
exercises his liberty, which the state (ie. government) is bound to
protect.

LIBERTY: Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing,
and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence
from without. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1^38

Liberty is one of the three great subdivisions of civil rights.
Its intent and meaning, as shown by definition, is clear and
understandable.

This Country was founded on the basis that all men

were to be allowed the free exercise of it. The Declaration of
Independance tells us that governments are instituted among men to
secure and protect it.

(addendum #^ ) Utah's own Declaration of

Rights, Article I, Section 1 confirms Liberty as a right which all
men have.

In addition:

PERSONAL LIBERTY: Consists in the power of locomotion,
of changing situation, of removing one's person to whatever
place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or
restraint unless by due course of law. Bouvierfs Law
Dictionary, p. 1965
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What is here defined as "personal liberty", is plain and simple
doctrine.
it.

The Constitution guarantees it, and the Defendant claims

The question therefor becomes; how much Liberty does the

Defendant possess as a right, and how much Liberty can his government
take away from him, and under what conditions, while protecting that
right.
This situation reminds the Defendant of a legend in Norse
mythology.

It seems that Loki, the brother to Thor, had been

sentenced to death as a consequence of his mischievousness.

He was

however, granted one request from Odin, the Father of all. Loki's
request was, that since he was to lose his head, no portion of his
neck was to be taken with it.

The executioner could not determine

where Loki's neck stopped and where his head began.

Consequently

Loki kept his neck and his head, as Odin's promise to Loki was the
law.

;

This same principle must of necessity apply when considering
the rights of the Defendant.

Since such rights are absolute, the

smallest effort to infringe on them works to deprive them from the
Defendant.

Whether that right be liberty, property, due process,

counsel, jury, or whatever, when a law works as an infringement on
a right of an individual, the right must prevail in all cases. Is
this not why, in the Miranda case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

"Where rights secured by the constitution are involved,
there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them." Miranda v Arizona, J8k U.S. ^36, ^91
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The Defendant of course, recognizes that Miranda was a murder
case, and the case now before this Court is a traffic case.

The issue

of rights remains the same however, and the Defendant does not
believe the four-square rule necessarily applies.
Rights are just that!
for them.

Rights!

Many men have fought and died

The Defendant himself has lost his liberty, 23 days in

jail in this case, by fighting for them.

The question this Court

must decide is how much Liberty, ie. right to travel, does the
Defendant possess as a Right, and at what point does government
infringe on that Right.

Then, under what conditions can the

Defendant lose all or any portion of that Right?
The Defendant contends that he possesses all of his rights of
Liberty, and that traveling is a part of Liberty which cannot be
deprived him without due course of law.

Simple legislative enactment

of a statute is not due course of law, and does not comprise
sufficient grounds to restrain the Defendant from the free exercise
of his personal liberty, and his freedom to travel by the conveyance
of the day.
PROPERTY

PROPERTY: The sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe. 2 Black's Commentary 2

The Defendant claims his absolute right to ownership of property.
That property in this case being, the conveyance of the day.

100

years ago it might
have been a horse drawn wagon. 100 years from
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now it might be a solar powered flitter.

Today, it happens to be

a pick-up truck powered by an internal combustion engine. Whatever
it is, the Defendant claims absolute ownership of it.

It is his in

allodial freehold, or fee simple if you will. Whatever you wish to
call it, no one else claims an interest in it, nor can they.
Defendant paid for it, exchanging substance for substance.

The

No debt

was incured in the transaction, with all parties being satisfied.
The right of property includes the ability to use, possess,
enjoy, and dispose of it. This Court said as much in the McGrew case.

"Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy
and dispose of a thing, the term often being used to indicate
the res or subject of the property, rather than the property
itself.
Property embraces all valuable interests which a man may
possess outside of himself, that is to say, outside of his life
and liberty. It is not confined to mere tangible property, but
extends to every species of vested right. McGrew ,v. Industrial
Comm., 96 U. 203, 85 P. 2nd 608

The Defendant claims that Title M

U.C.A. does not contemplate

the rights of property as applied to him.
as a privilege granted by the legislature.

It contemplates property
This is in direct

conflict with property as a right, as indicated in the McGrew case
The Defendant contends that equally as important to his right
to travel, is his right to use his property in the exercise of his
right to travel on the highway.
Title kl U.C.A. does not contemplate the Defendants1 rights of
property, and therefor are unconstitutional when enforced against him.
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property, and therefor are unconstitutional when enforced against him.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
No statute can be constitutional, when through its enforcment,
the executive & judicial branches of government can run slipshod
over the Defendant while systematically denying due process of law.
The denial of due process substantially affects the jurisdiction of
the Court, and the ultimate outcome.

The improprieties of the agents

of the King in denying due process to the Defendant were blantent
and contrived through the machinations of the Prosecutor, Judge, &
Police Officers, (record, pp. 56-65, 126-128, 139-1^2, 1^5-156)
The Defendant was not read his Miranda rights at the alledged
scene of the crime.

That fact was' easily controverted in the trial

de novo once the two arresting officers were appraised of their
mistake.

They didn't have to account to the Justice of the Peace,

as he was not about to rule on any issue of constitutionallity.
With no record at the Justice Court level, the lack of the Miranda
rights was no issue for the Defendant in the District Court.
The Defendant demanded counsel at the alledged scene of the
crime, and the officers refused to secure counsel for him.
The Defendant's property was seized without warrant, and never
used as evidence.

The taking of the Defendant's property was done

with the intention of punishing the Defendant for some crime he had
not yet been convicted of. He is still being, punished at this time.
This is in violation of the Defendant's right against punishment
before conviction, pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-1-4. (addendum # 5 )
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In addition, the Justice of the Peace the in ordered that the
Defendant's property be held as ransom, requiring the Defendant, should
he pay the ransom, to be subject to greater penalties than allowable
by law.

(Title 76, Chapter 3, part 3,

addendum # 6

The Defendant was not properly arraigned before the Justice
of the Peace, pursuant to Rules 10 & 11, U.R.Cr. P.
he was not advised of his Rights.

Furthermore,

In addition, the complaint brought

a*
against the Defendant was brought %n hearsay ^¥idonoe, and not by the
complaining officers.
When the Defendant demanded counsel of his choice, he was
denied his counsel and ordered to accept alternate counsel, or the
Justice of the Peace was going to waive his counsel.

This the

Judge did. Whoftthe Defendant advised the Justice Court that he
would not waive his right to counsel, the Judge immediately ordered
the Defendant incarcerated.

This violates the U.S. Supreme Court

ruling in the Argersinger case.
"We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intellegent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."
"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know
when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may
be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused
is' represented by counsel." Argersinger v Hamlin, Sheriff,
^07 u.s. 25

The Justice of the Peace was well advised of this ruling and
chose to ignore it, as did the District Court Judge.
61,
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The Justice of the Peace consistently did not understand the
various arguments of the Defendant, and sought advice and counsel
from the Prosecutor, who was also the attorney for the City of
Salina.

This substantially affected the setting of the Court, and

the proper roles of the Judge and the Prosecutor.
The Justice of the Peace allowed the Prosecutor to voi dire the
jury with his own questioning without interruption, until he was done.
After the Defendant began his questioning of the prospective jurors,
the Justice of the Peace stopped the procedings of jury voi dire,
when it became evident that there was obvious predjudice and
formulated opinions of the prospective jurors, to the detriment of
the Defendant, and he was requiring the removal of prejudicial
prospective jurors for cause.

After three prospective jurors had

been removed for cause, the Justice of the Peace refused to allow
the Defendant to question any more prospective jurors.

The Justice

of the Peace then asked questions of a general nature of the
prospective jurors himself.

This did not allow equal protection to

the Defendant by allowing him the same considerations that had been
granted to the Prosecutor.
The Defendant was denied his opportunity to present his full
and complete testimony to the Court.

On several occations during

his testimony, the Justice of the Peace threatened the Defendant
with contempt charges based on the testimony he was presenting while
being a witness in his own behalf.

In addition, the Justice of the

Peace kept ordering under threat of contempt, the Defendant to give
testimony he was not capable of giving, or which would deny him his
rights.
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The Justice of the Peace did not observe and follow Rule 19(b),
U.R.Cr. P.

(addendum #7 ) He simply threw away the Defendant's

jury instructions.
Court.

The Defendant filed 26 jury instructions with the

Evidence of the Judge's actions can be found in the fact that

they are not contained in the docket the Justice of the Peace is
required to forward to the District Court on appeal.
These matters of due process are not to indicate that they are
the only issues which were denied to the Defendant.

There were more.

However, space and memory are restrictive factors.

In addition, much

of what happened to the Defendant in the Justice Court was merelyrepeated in the District Court.

If the Justice Court cannot or

will not observe and protect the rights of due process to the Defendant,
then it must not be a duly constituted Court of this State, and must
not have had the jurisdiction to try this matter.
PRIVACY
The Defendant would contend that Title M

U.C.A. does not

recognize nor contemplate the rights of the Defendant.

In particular,

it violates his privacy as guaranteed under Article I, Section 14,
Utah State Constitution.
The application for a driver's license in particular, requires
certain information about the Defendant which is private in nature.
And, when the license certificate issues, it contains a major
portion of such private information.

The Defendant finds no com-

pelling need for any person, organization, or government entity to
have such information, and to make application for, or to receive a
license would waive any objection to disclosure of said information.
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Title M

U.C.A. further violates said privacy by compelling

the specific performance of the individual who is in possession of
such a license certificate, to offer up such evidence at the demand
of a Peace Officer.

(Section lH-2-15 U.C.A., addendum #8)

The Defendant readily agrees that the individual who is in
possession of a driver's license issued by the state can be compelled
to present it on demand, even though it violates said right to
privacy.
The Defendant understands that when application is made, and
the license is received, the individual doing such, waives certain
rights and consents to regulation and privilege.

He waives any

immunity he may have possessed as a natural person, and becomes a
subject, being subject to the statute.

Implied consent comes into

effect, and therefor works on that individual to require a specific
performance, even to his detriment by requiring him to become a
witness against himself, proffering to the agent of the King,
evidence, which can then be used against him.
The Defendant however, does not consent to such a waiver of
his rights to privacy, nor does he waive his right to be protected
against being a witness, or self-incrimination.
The Defendant contends that the requirement to obtain a driver's
license in order to exercise his right to travel is a violation of
his right to privacy, and such a violation of his rights through
statutory law invalidates that law, and therefor the Justice Court
lacked jurisdiction. .
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SUBJECT MATTER OF TITLE *H U.C.A.

Title 4l of the Utah Code, and more specifically, those sections
under which the Defendant has been convicted, act directly on him as
if a contract exists which attempts to compel him to a specific
performance.

In relation to such constructive, law is the compulsion

by distraint upon the Defendant, to either submit to the jurisdiction
of the statutes in order to enjoy his God given agency, or suffer the
enforcment penalties of fines and imprisonment for the free exercise
thereof.
The subject matter of Title kl U.C.A., attempts to prevent the
commission of some imaginary crime before that crime actually exists.
Such an imaginary crime, if projected forward to a physical existance,
might take the form of some automotive accident, wherein someone would
suffer a loss in some degree of life, liberty, or property.
What indicia is required to constitute a "crime"?

A crime

wherein an individual who commits the heinous act of traveling
throughout the land without his "papers" being in order, that he must
for the general safety and welfare of the people be put away behind
bars and locked doors, to be shut out of sight and mind.
The Defendant, in his admitedly limited capacity, has not been
able to pinpoint, or directly list the necessary indicia that
constitutes such a "crime". The Defendant has only been able to
determine the following elements that would necessarily constitute a
"crime" at law.
1.

The occurance of loss or injury.
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2.

Criminal causation of that loss or injury.

3.

The identity of the perpetrator.

Title M , U.C.A., works at a jurisdiction foreign to the
Defendant, as he is a natural person as previously described.

He is

not encumbered by any contract that would enter him into admiralty or
any other equity or chancery jurisdiction.

Title M , U.C.A. works to

prevent the cause of some imaginary crime, and does not work as
punishment to a crime.
The facts of this case are clear and they show that the Defendant
has not caused any loss or injury to another.

(transcript pp. 123 & 12*4,

125 & 126, 130, 132)
The common argument opposed to this concept is that the legislature
of the state has passed law and it has been signed into law by the
state executive.

The law (it is more correctly termed lex) exists,

and therefor it is prima facia evidence that a crime has been committed
on the face of the complaint.

It may be prima facia evidence, but that

is only until it is challenged, as in this case.
Where is the body?

Where is the crime?

To simply say that the

law (lex?) exists, and the complaint is brought forth, therefore the
corpus delecti is established is HOGWASH!

That is a fiction of law!

Title M , U.C.A. acts as a penal statute.

That may not be what

the State of Utah calls it, but it is a penal statute just the same.

PENAL STATUTES: Penal statutes are essentially those
actions which impose a penalty or punishment arbitrarily extracted
for some act or commission thereof on the part of some person.
Such statutes operate to compel a performance. Black1s Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., pp. 1019, 1020
"...and inflict a punishment by statute
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The Defendant has repeatedly argued that Title 4l and the
particular sections under which he was charged with violating, work
to compel a specific performance. What then, is specific performance?

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The actual performance of a contract
by the party bound to fulfil it. Bouvierfs, p. 3100

By applying reason, logic, and common sense, one can well understand that what the state is really trying to do, is bind the Defendant
to the obligation of a contract.
Where is this contract?

The Defendant must ask, what contract?

Who negotiated it?

The Defendant would offer

to this Court that such a contract might be articles of incorporation,
an insurance policy, a bank loan for property to be used on a highway,
a motor vehicle title, a motor vehicle registration, a bill of laden,
or maybe, just maybe a driver's license.

In any event, any instrument

which would bind upon a person to compel a specific performance.
There is no such instrument in existance, where the Defendant is
concerned.
In any case, with the violation of such a penal statute, comes
a penal action.

PENAL ACTIONS: Actions brought in England under a statute
forbidding or requiring an act to be done and rendering an
offender liable to pay a sum of money to be recovered from him
in a civil action. Thev are not criminal actions. Bouvier's,
p. 2551

What?

They are not criminal actions?

My!

My!
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Could this be one reason why so many states have converted their
motor vehicle statutes to infractions and civil actions, rather than
sending a man to jail for 6 months because he doesn't have a driver's
license?

(as in this case) "What kind of human beings are we?

It

isn't a crime to not have a driver's license, and Title M , U.C.A.
stretches beyond its jurisdiction to compel a specific performance
upon a natural person who exists at law.

As the Defendant has

stated before, the statute itself may work on those who are juristic
in nature, and have consented to regulation and privilege.

The

Defendant however, is unenfranchised, and to convict him of a "crime",
a "crime" must have been committed.

As no "crime" was ever shown to

exist by statute, nor was a "crime" ever shown to have been committed
by the Defendant in this case, the lower Court did err in exercising
jurisdiction in this case.

SELF IMPOSED DENIAL OF JURISDICTION

The Justice of the Peace, Thad toasden, consistantly refused to
consider any questions involving an issue concerning the Constitution
of the United States, or the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Various issues were raised in the course of the pre-trial procedings
challenging the validity of the statutes, and rights of the Defendant,
as has been shown in forgoing argument in this brief.

Having no

record of the Justice Court procedings, the Defendant calls attention
to the pleadings of the Defendant contained in the record.
pp. 11-13, 56-59, 60-65, 67-75, 95-123, 126-127, 137-157)
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In every instance where the Defendant called for a decision of
the Justice Court to determine his Constitutionally protected rights,
or make a determination of a statute, the Judge would first consult
with his legal counsel, (the prosecutor) and then follow his
counsil's advice or refuse to rule.

Of course the prosecutor was

not about to give the Justice of the Peace any advice which would
assist him to rule in favor of the Defendant.
On numerous occasions, the Justice of the Peace stated, "I
will not rule on any issue concerning the Constitution."
Article IV, Section 10 of the Utah State Constitution sa;ys that
every person taking a public office shall take or subscribe an oath
to uphold, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States,
and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
If Thad Wasden did in fact swear to such an oath, then his
determination to not rule on any issue of Constitutionality would
be in violation of his oath of office, and a self imposed limitation
on the duties of his office.

Such a limitation on himself would

therefore deny any person appearing before him the opportunity to be
heard by a constitutionally bound judge, and in fact, such a judge
would voluntarily be setting aside his mantle of judgeship.

Such an

action by a Justice of the Peace, or any Judge of this State, would
automatically invalidate the jurisdiction of that court.
With the self admited refusal to rule on, or allow any argument
concerning a Constitutional issue presented before him, Thad Wasden,
the Justice of the Peace of Salina City, lacked the jurisdiction to
even hear the matter now before this Court.
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THAD WASDEN IS NOT A DULY SWORN JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

Without going into great detail to conserve his space for
argument in this brief, the Defendant has considerable reason to
believe that Thad Wasden is not a sworn public official under Article
IV, Section 10 of the Utah State Constitution.

The Defendant has

petitioned on several occasions for proof of Thad Wasden's oath
of office.

He was conveniently brushed off by the Salina City

recorder, and was finally advised that he was not entitled to it,
and the City of Salina need not provide him with a copy of it.
This was made on the advice of the Salina City attorney, the prosecutor
in this case.

If Thad Wasden is not a sworn Justice of the Peace,

then he lacked jurisdiction in this case, and the Defendant was
tried unlawfully.
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POINT #2

DOES ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW?

Article I, Section 12 grants to an accused person "the right
to appeal in all cases." Article I, Section 2k declares that all
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, outlines the
forum for review that is sought on appeal.

In case appealed from

District, Circuit, or Juvenile Corts, a forum is provided whereby
the decisions, rulings, and orders are reviewed by the appellate
court.

Such is not the case in an appeal from the Justice Court.
(addendum #9)
U.C.A. 77-35-26(K) indicates that an appeal from the Justice to the
District Court comes only by way of a new trial.

In this light,

should the appellant from a Justice Court have issues to raise
concerning jurisdiction, judicial improprieties, mishandling of the
case, lack of due process, objections to jury, objections to jury
instructions, deprivation of any rights, or any other consideration
that would normally be considered on an "appeal of right" from the
District, Circuit, or Juvenile Courts, he is denied his forum for
review of that court on appeal.

His only forum is a new trial,

which gives to the prosecution all of the defense and strategies
an accused person may have, in which case, the prosecution may then
move to ammend an incorrect information, alter an alledged charge
(as with this case), and work with the witnesse to alter or change
testimony pertinant to the innocence of the accused.
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All strategies & defenses are lost to an accused person who
must accept a trial de novo as his only recourse to appeal.

In

addition, there is no record available from the Justice Court he
appeals from.
What the Defendant in this case raises in his issue, is that
appealing from the Justice to the District Court, he is denied his
forum for review.

The forum that exists in appeals from all other

courts in this state, and even from administrative agencies of this
state, is denied to him because he is forced to accept a trial de
novo only.

This problem is then compounded should the defendant

seek review to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

Article VIII,

Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution (I896) limits what issues
the Supreme Court can hear on appeal, when an appeal comes to the
Supreme Court having originated in the Justice Court.
The Defendant, having been denied a forum for review of the
Justice Court procedings by being forced into a trial de novo in the
District Court, is again denied his forum for review of the District
Court procedings in the Supreme Court should he need to raise an
issue of controversy arising from the District Court.

As in this

case, should the defendant, on appeal to the Supreme Court, not raise
a challenge to the validity or constitutionality of the statute, he
could not appeal to the Supreme Court of any malfeasance in the
District Court; ie. the District Court denied the Defendant a
constitutionally comprised 8 man jury.

(Article I, Section 10,.,

Utah State Constitution.
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Consequently, the District Court does not have to provide for
the Defendant his forum for review on appeal from the Justice Court.
In fact, the way is laid open for unaccountable corruption.

The

Justice of the Peace is not acountable for his actions in the Courtroom as there is no recourd of the procedings.

The District Court

Judge is not accountable for his actions in the Courtroom as the
accused cannot appeal any higher.

This confounds justice, and

denies the Defendant his right to appeal. That right to appeal
being the same forum for review as provided to other appellants from
other courts in this state.
In light of the previous decisions of this Court in its rulings
in the Taylor, Munger, and Christiensen cases (State v. Taylor, Utah,
66^ P2d ^39 (1983); State v. Munger, Utah, 642 P2d 721 (1982);
State v. Christensen, 13 Utah Advance Reports 3 (1985)i Article VIII,
Section 9> Utah State Constitution (1896) violates the right of
equal protection and the uniform application of the laws of this
state, to the Defendant.

He has not been provided an adequate forum

for review of his case. He has been slam-banged around with everyone
pretending that justice has been served, when no one will consider
what the police officers, prosecutor, and judges have done to deny
him

his counsel, jury, due process, and other rights. The Defendant

has a right to equal protection, and he has a right :o a forum for
review of his case.
The Defendant was not granted a forum to consider whether the
Officers gave him a lawful order.

There was no forum to consider

whether the Justice of the Peace or the Police officers denied him
council, before
he was incarcerated. There is no forum to consider
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There is no forum to review the decision of the District court to
deny the Defendant an 8 man jury, or its decision to incarcerate the
Defendant because he was forced to represent himself in the trial
de novo.

(transcripts not provided)

There is no forum to review

the Defendant's jury instructions that were not given in the District
Court trial.
Indeed, where lies the forum to review the action of the District
Court to bring a new charge on the Defendant, when he is in that
court on review of other charges?

A trial de novo is a re-trial,

yet the District Court created a new offense and a new trial. The
Defendant was never arraigned on that new charge, tohere then lies
the Defendant's forum to review that action in the District Court?
Without a forum for review of the entire case, the Defendant
is not granted the same protection that is granted to other appellants,
and this Court should reverse the decision of the Justice Court.
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POINT #3 WAS THE APPELLANT GIVEN A LAWFUL ORDER PURSUANT TO U.C.A
SECTION 41-6-13, FOR WHICH HE COULD BE CHARGED WITH FAILING
TO OBEY?

The Defendant-Appellant is at a loss as to how to argue this
issue of a lawful order.
disputed issues of law.

There are disputed issues of fact, and
The Defendant wishes to present the issues

of fact so that the issue of law may be decided.
To decide whether or not the Defendant was given a lawful order,
this Court must first decide what order was given.

It must then

decide whether or not that order was lawful in accordance with U.C.A.
section 41-6-13 (addendum #10), and whether or not that section is
applicable to the Defendant in this particular case.
The Defendant claims that he was first ordered to show his driver's
license, and that he refused, claiming the protection of Constitutional
immunity.

The police report bears out the fact that a driver's

license was first demanded of the Defendant, and that he claimed
Constitutional protection.

The Police officer (Charles R. Woodside)

placed the Defendant under arrest at that time, and thereafter ordered
him from the vehicle.

(record pp. 50, 51) (addendum #11) The police

report bears out the fact that the Defendant was placed under arrest
by officer Woodside before there was any effort to ask or remove him
from his vehicle.
The Defendant would contend that the only order given by officer
Woodside, that could be construed as lawful, was to demand a driver's
license of the Defendant.
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When officer, Gordon Kiesel, appeared on the scene he too asked
for the Defendant to show his driverfs license.

The Defendant again

invoked his Constitutional protection to privacy.

Officer Kiesel then

told the Defendant that he was under arrest and to, "get out of the
vehicle".

The Defendant then asked what he was under arrest for.

Officer Kiesel said that the Defendant was under arrest for failing
to obey the lawful order of a police officer, when the Defendant
asked the officer what the lawful order was that Officer Kiesel had
given him, Officer Kiesel said that he (the Defendant) had failed
to display his driver's license on demand.
The testimony of the two officers in the Justice Court was that
the "lawful" order given to the Defendant at the alledged scene of
the crime, was to display his driver's license.

(addendums #12 & #13)

On appeal to the District Court, the Defendant claimed to not
have a Utah driver's license, and therefore the police officers could
not lawfully order the Defendant to do that which was physically
impossible for him to do.
In the District Court trial, both police officers attempted to
change their testimony implying that the lawful order given to the
Defendant was to step out of the vehicle, and for the Defendant to
put his hands behind his head.

(transcript pp. 60-62, 90-91)

As there is no record of the testimony given in the Justice Court,
the Defendant can only rely on the eye-witness accounts of those
procedings, and his own testimony as to what the lawful order was that
the officers testified to. Also, the police report shows that the
Defendant was arrested before being asked from the vehicle.
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The first issue for this Court to decide would be whether the
lawful order given, which the Defendant was charged with failing to
obey was,
a. display a driver's license or;
b. get out of your vehicle, and put your hands behind your head.
If this Court determines that the order given to the Defendant
for which he was charged with failing to obey was to display a
driver's license, then was that order applicable to the Defendant
wherein he was totally incapable of obeying such an order?

Not only

was the Defendant not able to display a driver's license, but he was
also not able to display registration for the vehicle, or a safety
inspection sticker, as the vehicle was not registered to the Defendant,
nor was it registered in the State of Utah.

All of these facts were

clearly presented in this case.
In this case, the Defendant is not a licensee within the meaning
of U.C.A. section M-2-15* wherein it states:

"The licensee shall have his license in his immediate
possession at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall
display the same upon demand of a ....peace officer..."

The Defendant would concede that pursuant to that section of the
Utah Code, there are persons to which that section applies. And,
that when a peace officer demands a license to be displayed, the
licensee must comply.

Not being a licensee, the Defendant can no

more be ordered by a peace officer to display such, than to be ordered
to pull a rabbit out of his hat, or to produce for the peace officer a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$20 gold piece.

Therefor, to charge the Defendant with failure to

comply with such an order that the Defendant was not capable of complying with is unjust, and not within the scope of the police officerfs
authority.
If this Court determines that the Defendant was charged for
failing to obey the order to "get out of the vehicle", and "to put
you hands behind you head", then this Court must look to the
construction of U.C.A. section 41-6-13, and determine whether those
orders can be construed to be "lawful" within the meaning of that
section of the Code.

(see addendum #10)

To ask someone to step out of his vehicle, as the police report
indicates, does not sound like an order.

Let us suppose that the

officers didn't ask, but demanded "get out of the vehicle." Where
is the nexus between such an order, and the direction, control, or
regulation of traffic, other than this was a routine traffic stop?
Two (2) possibilities arise.

Either the police officers were acting

to safeguard the public, or pursuant to an arrest.

The Defendant was

not under the influence of alcholhol or drugs, nor had he been acting
in a wreckless manner.

The officers did not indicate that they had

been seeking to protect the public safety, so they must have ordered
the Defendant out of his vehicle, pursuant to a prior arrest.
If "get out of your vehicle" was a lawful order, why did the
officers order the Defendant out of his vehicle?
directing, controling, or regulating traffic?
out of his vehicle, then arrest him?
order him out
lawful order?

Was that order

Did they order him

Did they arrest him first, then

of his vehicle, then claim that he failed to obey a
Sounds like the cart is being put before the horse.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellantfs Brief - page 4 3
The Defendant was stopped for a broken headlight, and broken
taillights.

The Defendant, when stopped, parked off the highway so

his vehicle was not interfering with the flow of other vehicles on
the highway. Why would the officers demand that the Defendant exit
his vehicle, and claim that as a lawful order to arrest him, then
charge him pursuant to that section of the Code?
The Defendant would contend that a police officer does not have
the authority under section 41-6-13 to simply order people out of
their vehicle without cause.

There is no evidence in this case that

the officers had cause unless the Defendant's first argument on this
point is accepted, and the Defendant was already under arrest before
he was ordered from his vehicle.

If the Defendant's first argument

is accepted, the Defendant did not fail to comply, he was not capable
of complying with the order for which he was charged with not obeying.
In addition, failure to obey the order to M X display a driver'.;
license was a redundant charge on the Defendant, as he was already
charged with failure to display a driver's license to the police
officer under U.C.A. section 41-2-15.

(addendum #8)
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VI
CONCLUSION
The only conclusion to be drawn in this case is that the
Defendant was punished for attempting to exercise his constitutional
rights.

The police officers, Gordon Kiesel and Charles Woodside,

the Justice of the Peace, Thad Wasden, and the District Court Judge,
Don Tibbs, bent over backwards to ram the defendant through the
judicial system to bring him to justice.

The Defendant has had his

rights violated right from the beginning.

Deprivation of counsel

being among the most serious.

c

j^ry

It is apparent that throughout the

entire procedings, that the Defendant's efforts to obtain constitutional
immunity for the protection of his privacy, self incrimination, and
rights to appeal, only angered his adversaries. And yes, the Justice
of the Peace, and the District Court judge were his adversaries, as
indicated by the record.
The points presented clearly indicate that this Court must
heavily weigh the actions of the lower courts, the denial of due
process, and the application of the statutes on the Defendant.
WHEREFORE:
and

The Defendant respectifully requests oral argument,

prays the Court to reverse the decision of the Justice Court based

on the argument contained herein, and award to the Appellant costs
of this action, and particularly the heavy financial burden this
appeal has placed on him.
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Appellant's Brief - addendum #1
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
Title ^1, Chapter 1, Motor Vehicle Act
Article 1, Words and Phrases Defined
41-1-1, Definitions.
(t) "Person." Every natural person, firm, copartnership,
association, or corporation.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED , 1953 as ammended
68-3-12, Rules of construction as to these statutes.
(5) The word "person" includes bodies politic and corporate,
partnerships, associations and companies.
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"We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and a corporation,
and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and
papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual
may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled
to cary on his private business in his own way. His power to contract
is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so
far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the
State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of
his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of
the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only
be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the
Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself,
and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure
except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public
so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. ^3, at p. 7^
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"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their .just powers from the consent of the governed."
Declaration of Independence, (emphasis added)
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
77-l-^i Conviction to precede punishment.
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted
in a court having jurisdiction.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant's Brief - addendum #6
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
76-3-3OI, Fines of persons.
(k) $299 when the conviction is of a class B or C misdemeanor
or infraction.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
77-35-19." Rule 19 - Instructions.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused,
the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If
part be given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing
by the endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part
was refused.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
41-2-15- License to be carried when driving - Production in court.
The licensee shall have his license in his immediate possession
at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display the same
upon demand of a justice of peace, a peace officer or a field deputy
or inspector of the department. It shall be a defense to any charge
under this subsection that the person so charged produce in court an
operator1s license theretofore issued to such person and valid at the
time of his arrest.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
77-35-26. Rule 26 - Appeals.
(k) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment
rendered in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this
rule, except as follows:
(1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and
the decision of the district court shall be final except in cases
where the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is
raised in the justice court;
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 as ammended
41-6-13- Obedience to police officer.
No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful
order or direction of any police officer invested by law with authority
to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
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EXCERPT TAKEN FROM SALINA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT COMPLAINT REPORT
Record pp. 50, 51

"R/P got into the patrolcar and proceded to the Chevron station.
R/P at that time asked the driver for his drivers license and registration."
"The driver advised R/P that unless R/P had a 4th amendment warrent
R/P couldfnt (SIC) see his drivers license. R/P asked the driver
several times to produce his drivers license and registration and the
driver gave the same answer. "Not without a fourth amendment warrent".
"R/P then advised the driver he was being stopped for only having
1 head lamp, no tail lights, no Utah registration and no safety inspection. R/P then asked the driver for his drivers license and registration."
"The driver again refused to produce his drivers license and
registration and then ask R/P if he was under arrest."
"R/P again asked him to show his drivers license and registration
and again he refused and stated to the effect that it was his
constitutional rights to drive and without a 4th amendment warrent he
would show R/P nothing."
"At this R/P advised the driver he was under arrest and asked
him to step out of the vehicle."
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JOSEPH M. WISDEN
FREEMAN
950 N. 1350 ^est
Section 35, Township 6 South, Range 2 East
Utah County, Utah 84604
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)ITY OF SALINA
Respondent

CASE NO. 20498

vs
AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS

JOSEPH M. vJISDEN
Appellant

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Utah

)
)

ss.

AFFIDAVIT

I, David R. Wisden, having been duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a resident of Pima County, State of Arizona,

2.

I am over 21 years of age.

3.

I was witness to the trial of Joseph M. vJisden, in the

Justice Court of Salina City, on the l4th of May 1984.
4.

I was personally present in the Courtroom during the

testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, namely Charles R.
Woodside, and Gordon Keisel, Salina City Police Officers.
5.

I heard the testimony of both officers concerning the charge

of not complying with a lawful order, against Joseph M. hisden.
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6.

Under cross-examination, both officers testified to the

order which they gave to Joseph M. Wisden, which they alledged he
failed to comply with, which he was arrested for at the traffic stop
of 24 February 1984.
7.

The order both officers testified to, that Joseph M.

.•u'is den had been given was, "refusing to display his driver's
license on demand of a peace officer."
8. At the time of the trial of 14 May 1984, I was a resident
of fampete County, Utah.
Dated this 11th day of April, 1985.

JCLU/^-

6JJM^I^

DAVID R. WISDEN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of April, 1985

R^UTAH

Residing in

}\Q \JLJ

^ -

^->*1«.M '

. Utah

A
My commission expires: «"* \'" •
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:'

I, Joseph M. Wisden, do hereby certify that I have either
hand delivered or mailed the appropriate number of copies of the
da

foregoing document on the c O

y

of

February, 1986, first class

postage prepaid, to the following:

D. MICHAEL JORGENSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
143 South State Street
Salina, Utah 84654
Attorney for Respondent

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
Utah State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

)©5

k

YAbdxA^

JOSEPH M. WISDEN

K-

t
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